Tuesday, April 24, 2012

The Limits of Tolerance

Mona Eltahawy has a powerful article on misogyny in Arab countries and posits that no argument can justify the violence and subjugation of women in Arab countries.  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/why_do_they_hate_us

I agree with Ms. Eltahawy's position.  As a general philosophical matter, human conduct must be judged pragmatically.  Hence, Ms. Eltahawy can argue persuasively that such relativistic concepts as cultural tradition do not justify violence against women.  If we dispense with the notion that abhorrent behavior can be excused based on tradition or history or any other such justification based on custom, we can set practical limits on ethical behavior.  Without the move to judge behavior pragmatically, we are left to shrug our shoulders and simply concede that while the behavior is abhorrent to us it is within the ethical parameters of the culture in which it arises; therefore, we cannot wholly condemn the behavior.  Ms. Eltahawy demonstrates that ethical behavior may operate on a continuum, but that some behavior can be judged unethical regardless of the cultural milieu from which the behavior arises.

Ms. Eltahawy identifies several unethical behaviors in how Arab countries treat women.  Some Arab countries deny women suffrage.  If we accept the premise that all persons are equal under the law, regardless of gender, then denying women the right to vote is unethical regardless of the tradition or religious text supporting the denial.  Quite simply, no justification of denying suffrage to adult women can render the decision ethical.  In addition, treating the relationship of men and women to sexuality differently is unethical.  Obviously men and women relate to sexuality differently given the fact that men and women are in fact separate genders.  Nevertheless, the requirement that women cover themselves without a concomitant requirement for males can have no ethical basis.  Similarly, the requirement that a man must accompany an adult woman in public but the lack of a reciprocal requirement can have no ethical basis.  If we accept the premise that an adult female possesses the same rights of self-determination that an adult male possesses, then any cultural tradition that limits a woman's rights of self-determination without a reciprocal limitation on males is unethical.

Ms. Eltahawy's piece reaches its most heartbreaking when addressing physical violence against women and the politico-legal complicity in that violence.  Ms. Eltahawy was herself groped by a fellow protester during the Tahrir Square demonstrations, a fact so odious as to defy comprehension.  In a dangerous and fever-pitched confrontation with the martial forces of an authoritarian regime, a protester could be so easily distracted by the mere presence of a woman that he would take the opportunity to cop a feel?  Frankly, this is sad comment on the infantilization of men in misogynistic societies.  If women are stylized as virgin/whore figures, then men are stylized as out-of-control children.  The message to men is that they cannot control themselves in their relations to women and therefore cannot be held accountable for their actions.  What mature man gropes a woman he does not know?  That such an experience would be so titillating that one would act on it demonstrates the infantile quality of the man raised in a misogynistic society.  Imagine the excitement that the explosion of self-determination inspired in the protesters and then the despair at knowing even here someone manages to treat you as a voiceless object, as a mere thing to be touched?

The groping incident is just the tip of the iceberg, though.  The Egyptian police arrested Ms. Eltahawy during the demonstrations and battered her.  While in custody, the Egyptian police sexually assaulted her (on a public street) and broke one of her arms and one of her hands.  The police remain unpunished.  Similar horror stories abound.  In 2002 15 Saudi girls died in a fire because the "morality police" would not allow them to flee the building because they were not covered.  Nothing happened after this incident.  Ms. Eltahawy discusses genital mutilation and minors coerced into marriage who die in childbirth.  The list is disgusting and shocking.

Such violence and the legal and administrative apparatus that allows the perpetrators to go unpunished have no ethical justification.  There is simply no circumstances in which rape can be legitimated.  There is no circumstance where cultural norms regarding modesty can be used to justify forcing girls to die in a fire.  There is no tradition that can claim moral legitimacy that physically maims and injures a girl's genitals.  The only way to judge these acts is against the backdrop of pragmatic morality:  are these acts necessary?  If not, do the acts cause harm?  If the answer is yes, no argument can turn these acts into ethical ones.  Ms. Eltahawy should be commended for reminding us that some things in the world cannot be justified under any circumstances.  Misogyny is one such thing.

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Dworkin on the Affordable Care Act Mandate

Ronald Dworkin has a good piece at the New York Review of Books on why the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act is constitutional.  http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/may/10/why-mandate-constitutional-real-argument/

He does two things well.  First, he reminds us that entitlements are no such thing but are in fact forms of social insurance in which risk of social harm is spread across the population to minimize the harm to individuals and small groups.  We use social insurance to spread risk because typically harm does not occur to a majority of individuals at the same time, despite the fact that the harm is likely to occur to a majority of individuals over time.  Hence, the need to enact social insurance programs that enlist the majority who are not presently harmed because we understand that those being harmed will never possess the political clout (i.e. they will not have the votes) to elect sympathetic legislators except at extraordinary moments in time.  This was true of the post-Civil War amendments (13-15), the FDA, the Social Security Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and myriad other important social insurance or regulatory programs.  The same is true today with the Affordable Care Act and Dworkin explains the social insurance act well and concisely.

Second, Dworkin provides a legal analysis accessible to any non-lawyer of moderate intelligence that demonstrates the constitutionality of the mandate.  This forms the bulk of his opinion and is worth the read.  I enjoyed his description of the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito as ultraconservative.  I find the description apt.  William Rehnquist was conservative.  Warren Burger was conservative.  Sandra Day O'Connor was conservative.  The gang of four are nothing like conservative justices.  The conservatives were frustrating because of their insistence on (the conservative principles) of slow, incremental change and respect for precedent.  If only we could have those salad days back instead of the current ethos that removes the constitution from context and presumes that four persons living in 2012 can somehow divine the precise thoughts of men who died about 200 years ago.  I also find it amusing that this faction adopts the term "strict constructionist" to describe their method of constitutional interpretation when the very fact that a case is before them suggests more than one reasonable interpretation exists.  Perhaps I should not be surprised.  The legal profession is not known for self-deprecation and humility.  I do, however, want to find the talisman that allows these four old men in black robes to enter the minds of long dead men and divine the obvious and only meaning of an often ambiguous and vague document.

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Armed America

Jill Lepore has a good piece in the New Yorker on violence, gun rights, and the second amendment.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/04/23/120423fa_fact_lepore  The best line from the piece is:

"When carrying a concealed weapon for self-defense is understood not as a failure of civil society, to be mourned, but as an act of citizenship, to be vaunted, there is little civilian life left."

I have some qualms with the article.  Namely, that Lepore touches on so many aspects of the history of guns in American life that the article at times feels a bit disconnected.  Nevertheless, Lepore does well to demonstrate that the NRA's position on gun control has more to do with conservative politics than firearm ownership.  She also does well to point out the silliness of the NRA position that Barack Obama will do anything to infringe on gun ownership rights.  Finally, one cannot help but wonder how we got to the point where a private citizen could willfully initiate a confrontation with another private citizen in a public place and claim a perfect defense to criminal liability.

What strikes me most about gun rights advocates is not the idea that one ought to be able to own a firearm but the notion that gun ownership is somehow necessary.  Lepore's formulation above conveys the absurdity of the matter well.  In my own thoughts, I consider the argument that gun ownership is necessary essentially admits that we are not adults.  The idea of life in a society so fragile that the only mechanism of self-preservation is the threat of violence from every individual is so fraught with insecurity as to be unimaginable.  The point of civil society is civility, a common understanding of the basic rights and rules of interaction in the public and private spheres so that we are able to function without constant suspicion and fear.  Civil society is supposed to elevate us beyond the insecurity of mere survival so that we can, as a society, flourish in ways pre-civil societies cannot.  The gun rights advocates turn this on its head and tell us that it is in fact better if we revert to an age when the very act of survival is precarious, anxious, and fearful.  Doesn't anyone else think this is insane?


Thursday, April 12, 2012

The Myth of Black on Black Violence

Edward Wykoff Williams has a good piece in The Root today exposing the problems with the notion of "black on black" violence.  http://www.theroot.com/views/why-don-t-we-talk-about-white-white-crime  As Williams notes, most crime in all ethnic groups is committed by members of the same ethnic groups yet we do not speak of a white on white violence problem.  In addition, Williams does an outstanding job of bringing out the simple fact that the idea of "black on black" violence has led to greater policing in black neighborhoods which, predictably, leads to greater arrests of black persons and increased entanglement with the criminal justice system.  Finally, Williams cites the pioneering work of Professor Michelle Alexander on the profoundly disturbing impact disparate enforcement of the law has had on the black community.   The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.  Professor Alexander's book should be required reading for every American, but especially for those who do not believe racism is alive and well in America today.


The rate at which persons of one ethnic group commit crimes against persons of the same ethnic group is evidence that the melting pot metaphor does not hold.  Our nation and our cities are divided places.  The lines along which we divide are predictable, but sad:  race, ethnicity, poverty, wealth, etc.  Obviously this is nothing new, but the Williams piece and the literature he cites bring home the point of how hopelessly divided our society is in a novel manner.  Rhetoric of freedom and equality aside (which, if you think about it for a moment, are actually opposing ideas), we remain a balkanized or ghettoized society.  We should view pronouncments about any single ethnic group with suspicion to discern hidden motives and flawed assumptions and we should view pronouncements about the black community with an even more critical eye given the ongoing institutionalized disparate treatment of African Americans.